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FAILURE TO ADMINISTER OATH BEFORE VOIR DIRE
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR
State v. Glaros
170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N.E.2d 379 (1960)
Defendant was convicted in the Common Pleas Court of Mahoning
County, Ohio, of aiding and abetting an embezzlement.' On the third day
of the trial, the court revealed that it had failed to put the prospective
jurors under oath or affirmation before examination on voir dire. Ohio
Rev. Code section 2945.27 as amended, effective September 9, 1957, re-
quires the trial judge to administer the oath or affirmation before the jurors'
examination.2  Defendant's counsel stated that he could not and would
not attempt to waive the mandatory requirement of the law. The court,
nevertheless, permitted the trial to continue to verdict and judgment. On
appeal the court of appeals reversed, stating in part:
Through inadvertence the prospective jurors were not sworn
as required by Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 2945.27 and therefore the
defendant was not placed on trial before a legally constituted
jury ... A legal duty has been created by the General Assembly,
that the judge shall examine the prospective jurors under oath or
upon affirmation as to their qualifications to serve as fair and
impartial jurors. This duty was not carried through .... 3
The Ohio Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, reversed the
court of appeals, holding that where it did not appear that the defendant
had been prejudiced, failure of the trial court to give the oath or affirmation
as indicated by the statute was not reversible error,4 and also that such
failure would not entitle the defendant to a new trial if defendant and his
counsel failed to call the error to the attention of the court; 5 in other words,
the defendant had waived his right to a new trial.
As in most jurisdictions, 6 Ohio has decided by statute7 that reviewing
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.34 (1953) "Embezzlement or Fraudulent Conversion." Ohio
Rev. Code § 1.17 (1953) "Aiders and Abettors."
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.27 (1957) "The judge of the trial court shall examine the
prospective jurors under oath or upon affirmation as to their qualifications to serve as fair
and impartial jurors, but he shall permit reasonable examination of such jurors by the
prosecuting attorney and by the defendant or his counsel." The italicized portion was
added by an amendment in 1957.
3 State v. Glaros, Appearance Docket No. 9, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
Mahoning County, June 10, 1959.
4 State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N.E.2d 379 (1960).
5 Ibid.
6 3 Am. Jur. "Appeal and Error," § 1006 (1936).
7 Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.83 (1953) "No motion for a new trial shall be granted or
verdict set aside, nor shall any judgment of conviction be reversed in any court because
of: (A) An inaccuracy or imperfection in the indictment, information, or warrant, . .. (B)
A variance between the allegations and the proof thereof unless . .. (C) The admission or
rejection of any evidence .. .unless . . . (D) A misdirection of the jury unless . . . (E)
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courts shall not reverse judgments of lower courts in criminal cases for
errors or defects which do not affirmatively appear to affect the substantial
rights of the accused. An error or defect which affects the substantial rights
of the accused is one from which he sustains injury.8 It is an error which
prejudices the cause of the accused, while a technical error is one not
affecting the substance of the issues or the substantial rights of a party.9
This statute is mandatory upon the courts' ° and in order to reverse a judg-
ment of conviction it must affirmatively appear that the accused was prej-
udiced thereby or was prevented from having a fair trial. It has even been
held that prejudicial error will not be cause for reversal unless the error is
called to the attention of the court at the time of its commission.'1 The
modern trend is away from technicalities toward substance. It was formerly
the view of the courts that any technical error was grounds for reversal
because it might have prejudiced the accused. 12 The modern view is that it
should be shown that it probably did prejudice him, before a reversal will
be justified.' 3 There was no showing whatsoever in State v. Glaros that
Glaros had been prejudiced or was prevented from having a fair trial, and
neither statute nor precedent warrants a reversal on the basis of the alleged
error.
Both the dissent in the Supreme Court and the entire court of appeals
stress that the failure of the trial court to administer the oath or affirmation
to the prospective jurors caused the trial to be a nullity.' 4 They emphasize
that the legislature, in amending Ohio Rev. Code section 2945.27, clearly
intended that no jury could be legally impaneled without examination on
voir dire under oath or upon affirmation. This view cannot be sustained
either by what little legislative history is available' 5 or by past judicial
interpretation.' 6 The majority opinion does not so much as discuss this
line of argument, possibly indicating a lack of belief in its probative force.
Any other cause unless it appears affirmatively from the record that the accused was
prejudiced thereby or was prevented from having a fair trial."
8 People v. Perlman, 128 Misc. 68, 217 N.Y. Supp. 662, (Sup. Ct. 1926).
9 Hintz v. Wagner, 25 N.D. 110, 140 N.W. 729 (1913).
10 State v. Moon, 124 Ohio St. 465, 179 N.E. 350 (1931); Makley v. State, 49 Ohio
App. 359, 197 N.E. 339 (1934).
11 State v. Kollar, 93 Ohio St. 89, 112 N.E. 196 (1915).
12 Young v. State, 6 Ohio 435 (1835).
13 State v. Daniels, 169 Ohio St. 87 n.3, 157 N.E.2d 736 n.3 (1959) ; State v. Schultz,
96 Ohio St. 114, 117 N.E. 229 (1917); State v. Jenkins, 76 Ohio App. 277, 64 N.E.
2d 86 (1944).
14 State v. Glaros, supra note 4, at 480, 166 N.E.2d at 386; State v. Glaros, supra
note 3.
15 The title to the 1957 amendment reads as follows: "An act to amend sections
2313.42, 2790.14 and 2945.27 of the Revised Code, to authorize the examination of pro-
spective jurors under oath or affirmation." (Emphasis added.) The meaning of the word
"authorize" in this type of statute is equivocal; courts across the country are divided as
to whether it is mandatory or directory. See 4 Words and Phrases 844 (1940).
16 Before the 1957 amendment, which inserted the oath or affirmation requirement,
the Ohio courts of appeals had construed the statute to be directory only. In State v.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The court of appeals and the dissent in the Supreme Court claim that
waiver by the accused was not possible because one cannot "breathe life
into a proceeding which has never legally commenced. '1T This view also
cannot be sustained by precedent. The mandatory nature of a statute requir-
ing procedural steps to be taken does not make a trial without these steps a
nullity. It has been consistently held that failure to comply with the manda-
tory requirements of trial procedure will not be cause for reversal unless
there is an affirmative showing of prejudice to the accused.' 8 No such
affirmative showing appeared here.
It is also claimed by the dissent that an accused person cannot possibly
waive a mandatory requirement of law. But it has been held in analogous
situations that the right to jury trial itself, 19 to a speedy trial,20 to poll the
jury,21 to the appointment of counsel,22 to arraignment 23 (all of these being
fundamental substantive rights-mandatory requirements of law) may be
waived. There appears to be no reason for saying that failure to administer
the oath to prospective jurors before voir dire examination is any more
sacred or fundamental to the administration of justice than any of the fore-
going rights.
It has become apparent that the practice of reversing perfectly valid
judgments because of inconsequential errors not affecting the justice of the
case is becoming infrequent.24 The practice of preserving errors by main-
taining silence, thus preventing the trial court from correcting them, in
order to take advantage of a favorable verdict or to reverse an unfavorable
one, is to be discouraged.25 To avoid the possible effects of an error in a
trial when it occurs by giving the court every opportunity to correct it at
once is well recognized as an obligation of counsel. 26
In overruling the court of appeals, the Supreme Court has reiterated
Berkman, 79 Ohio App. 432, 74 N.E.2d 411 (1944) the Court of Appeals for Lucas
County held that it was not prejudicial error for the court to fail to examine prospective
jurors. In State v. Mays, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 43, 139 N.E.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1956) (appeal
dismissed for want of a debatable question, 165 Ohio St. 456, 135 N.E.2d 760 (1956)), the
Court of Appeals for Montgomery County held that "Examination of jurors by the court
is a matter of discretion and in the absence of a request failure to do so does not consti-
tute error prejudicial to the accused."
17 State v. Glaros, supra note 4, at 482, 166 N.E.2d at 386-87.
18 State v. Moon, supra note 10; Warner v. State, 104 Ohio St. 38, 135 N.E. 249
(1922); Nigro v. State, 23 Ohio L. Rep. 334 at 340 (Ct. App. 1922) (case on error
dismissed, 106 Ohio St. 659, 140 N.E. 942 (1922)).
19 State v. Frohner, 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E.2d 868 (1948).
20 Annot., 129 A.L.R. 574 (1940).
21 15 Ohio Jur. 2d Criminal Law" § 127 (1955).
22 In re Burson, 152 Ohio St. 375, 89 N.E.2d 651 (1949).
23 Wescoat v. State, 47 Ohio App. 266, 191 N.E. 816 (1934).
24 See: Cal. Pen. Code § 1258; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-2320 (1956); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.1096 (1954); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 542; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-117 (1955);
W. Va. Code § 5752 (1955).
25 Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90, 104, 117 N.E. 169, 173 (1917).
26 Glenn v. Nat'l Supply Co., 101 Ohio App. 6, 129 N.E.2d 189 (1954).
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and clarified its position concerning preservation of non-prejudicial error.
Failure to object to such error at the proper time is an effective waiver.
Failure to administer the oath or affirmation before voir dire examination
will not constitute reversible error unless objected to at the time of the
omission. An error of omission on the part of the court must affirmatively
be shown to have prejudiced the defendant or prevented him from having a
fair trial before it will be grounds foi reversal.
